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Al-Bihani, Not So Charming
ABSTRACT

In June 2008, the Supreme Court extended the Suspension
Clause to foreign detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. Since
then, courts have struggled to define appropriatestandards to
govern detainee habeas corpus petitions. Until recently, no
court questioned the relevance of international law to the
development of these standards. But, in January 2010, a D.C.
Circuit panel held that international law does not constrain
executive detention power. That decision could devastate
detainee habeas corpus petitions by preventing courts from
examining the heart of the government's own claimed detention
authority.
This Note evaluates the proper role of international law
during ongoing Guantdnamo detainee habeas corpus litigation
through an examination of the D.C. Circuit panel's legal
analysis in Al-Bihani v. Obama. Because internationallaw has
always played a role in U.S. jurisprudence,judges already have
the necessary tools to grapple with the internationallegal issues
that the detainee cases present. In light of the Legislature's
refusal to develop appropriatestandards to govern these cases,
the Judiciary must use these tools to balance national security
with individual liberty.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2008, the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v.
Bush extended the Suspension Clause to foreign nationals at
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.' However, the Court's analysis left crucial
questions unanswered. Some of these questions-such as what to do
with detainees once they are released from U.S. custody-are
primarily political.2 But at least one has been left for the courts to
decide. Now that Guantdnamo Bay detainees can challenge their
detention in U.S. courts,3 what is the extent of the President's
authority to detain them? 4
The President's detention power is an "important incident to the
conduct of war,"5 meant to "prevent captured individuals from
returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again."6
After September 11, the President's detention authority derives from
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). 7 Yet, the
procedural and substantive rules governing these detentions remain

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723-29 (2008).
1.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4895 (Jan. 22, 2009)
2.
(establishing policies for transferringGuantinamoBay detainees).
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (holding the Military Commissions Act of
3.
2006 to be an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004) (plurality
4.
opinion) (discussing the ability of the Executive Branch to detain enemy combatants).
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
5.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
6.

7.

Id.
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undefined, and the Supreme Court has left this task to the lower
courts.8
Until recently, no court questioned the relevance of international
law to the development of these rules. That changed in January 2010
when, in Al-Bihani v. Obama, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals broadly held that international law does not place
any constraints on the Executive's war powers, absent an explicit
congressional declaration to that effect. 9 That ruling will most likely
create binding precedent, preventing courts from considering
international law-based challenges to the Government's asserted
legal authority to detain.10 Yet, the Executive itself partly bases its
detention authority on international law." For that reason, many
Guantinamo detainee habeas petitions also rely on international
legal principles.12 Thus, left undisturbed, Al-Bihani has the potential
to cripple detainee habeas corpus review.
This Note evaluates, through an examination of Al-Bihani, the
proper role of international law during Guantinamo detainee habeas
corpus litigation. Part II outlines the Supreme Court's historical
treatment of international law and discusses the ramifications of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which precludes detainees
from relying on the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in civil
actions against the U.S. government13 and delegates authority to the
President to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions.' 4 Part II also suggests a method of incorporating
international law into judicial review that is both faithful to domestic
constraints and familiar to most lawyers-namely, the Chevron
doctrine. Part III examines Al-Bihani. Finally, Part IV revisits AlBihani's petition for habeas corpus and applies Chevron to the specific
facts of the case, thus illustrating the ease and practicality with
which the courts could consider the international law obligations of
the United States as they develop rules to govern detainee habeas
corpus challenges.

8.
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796 ('These and other questions regarding the
legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.").
9.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
10.
See, e.g., Order at 1, Al-Adahi v. Obama, 692 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2010)
(Civil Action No. 05-280 (GK)), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/
01/Al-Adahi-order-1-6-09.pdf (ordering another habeas proceeding to re-brief pertinent
legal issues in light of the Al-Bihani ruling).
11.
See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (2009) (discussing
authority for detention "in domestic law or the laws of war").
See id. at 70-71 (asking whether the authority of the AUMF is "consistent
12.
with the law of war").
13.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
14.
Id. § 6(a)(3).
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS:
THE CHARMING BETSY DOCTRINE

Despite broad assertions in Al-Bihani,15 courts have construed
domestic legislation in accordance with international law for more
than two hundred years. 16 Since at least 1801, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that, where possible, courts should interpret
U.S. law to conform to the international legal obligations of the
Recent statutory amendments do preclude
United States.' 7
individuals from invoking the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights in certain civil actions,' 8 but these provisions do not affect the
use of international law as an interpretive canon.
A. HistoricalTreatment of InternationalLaw in U.S.
Courts Under the Charming Betsy Doctrine
For more than two hundred years, the Supreme Court has held
that international law informs U.S. law, particularly in the context of
international humanitarian law. 19 In 1801, the Court held that
"Congress may authorize general hostilities, in which case the
general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities, in
which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our
situation, must be noticed."20 More famously, the Court explicitly
ruled three years later, in Murray v. Schooner CharmingBetsy, that
domestic legislation "ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently
can never be construed to violate neutral rights or to affect neutral
commerce further than is warranted by the law of nations as
understood in this country."2 ' This principle came to be known as the
CharmingBetsy doctrine.

See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("There is
15.
no indication in the AUMF, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 .. . or the MCA of
2006 or 2009, that Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extratextual limiting principles for the President's war powers under the AUMF.").
16.
See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (referring to "general
laws of war").
Id.
17.
18.
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 5(a).
19.
See, e.g., Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28; S. Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d
119, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[The Supreme Court has consistently held that
congressional statutes must be construed wherever possible in a manner that will not
require the United States to violate 'the law of nations."' (citing Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804))); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN REIATIONS LAW § 114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute
is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international
agreement of the United States.").
20.
Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28.
21.
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
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Under Charming Betsy, courts deciding between different
plausible interpretations of a law must presume that the text
complies with the United States' obligations under binding treaties
and accepted principles of customary international law.22 Supreme
Court cases have consistently followed this doctrine. 2 3 For example,
at the turn of the last century, the Court explicitly integrated
customary international law into its ruling in Paquete Habana.24 In
that case, the Court assessed the legality of the U.S. Navy's seizure of
two coastal fishing vessels during the Spanish-American War in the
absence of controlling domestic law. 25 The Court affirmed that U.S.
courts should analyze the question under principles of international
law. 26 Under these principles, "coast fishing vessels, pursuing their
vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized
as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of
war."27 Thus, because international law did not permit the Navy's
seizure of The Paquete Habana, the Court held that the seizure was
illegal.2 8
Of course, the political branches retain the power to disregard
international law, at least insofar as U.S. courts are concerned.
Under Charming Betsy, a "controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision" forecloses courts from considering international
law.29
Congress can thus prevent courts from considering
international law by clearly stating that it intends a piece of domestic
legislation to contravene international law.3 0 And, to the extent the
President acts pursuant to executive authority rather than
congressional authorization, CharmingBetsy is unnecessary because
courts do not need to construe any law.31 Thus, courts only employ
Charming Betsy when the President acts pursuant to congressional
authorization that does not clearly contravene international law.32 In

22.

See Ingrid Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, InternationalLaw,

and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 331-32 (noting that courts have
cited customary international law, as well as treaties, as the basis for applying
the CharmingBetsy canon).
23.
Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation:The Use
and Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339, 1353 (2006).
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900).
24.
25.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 700.
26.
27.
Id. at 686.
28.
Id. at 714.
29.
Id. at 700.
30.
See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (noting that the
defendant's ability to obtain relief under international law was "subject to" a recently
enacted domestic law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 115(1)(a) (stating that "[a]n act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of
international law" if that is the purpose of the act and it is clearly stated).
Wuerth, supra note 22, at 348-49.
31.
Id.
32.
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such cases, courts use CharmingBetsy to say "what the law is,"33 and
courts "refuse to automatically defer to the executive, even when its
views are clear and those of Congress are not."34 This means that
they will "occasionally use the canon to defeat the interpretation
offered by the government."35
Charming Betsy remains alive in modern jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court has not overruled the doctrine and has explicitly
considered it as recently as 2004.36 The Court's post-September 11
opinions have also been consistent with the doctrine.3 7 For example,
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court determined that the AUMF
permitted the government to hold a U.S. citizen captured in a foreign
country as an enemy combatant, in part because international law
permitted the detention.3 8 Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court declined to defer to the Executive's view of the Geneva
Conventions and, instead, undertook its own analysis that extended
the protections of Common Article 3 to those detainees. 39
In light of the doctrine's continued viability, courts should, if
possible, interpret domestic laws to comply with the United States'
international law obligations. 40 Congress must intentionally deviate
from international law to foreclose this method of interpretation. 41
And, though the President may authoritatively interpret
international law when acting pursuant to executive authority, courts
may disagree with the Executive's interpretation of international law
when it acts pursuant to legislation such as the AUMF. 42
Professor Ralph Steinhardt has distilled these principles into a
general three-step process. 43 First, courts should determine the
meaning and status of any relevant provision of international law. 44
Second, if "nothing in the statute explicitly repudiates [international

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (quoting Marbury v.
33.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Wuerth, supranote 22, at 343.
34.
35.

Id.

36.
See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(noting that Charming Betsy was among cases supporting the rule that Congress
usually "construes statutes to avoid unreasonable interference" with other states'
sovereignty).
But see Wuerth, supra note 22, at 295-97 (critiquing the Court's method of
37.
applying international law in Hamdi).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522-23 (2004) (plurality opinion); see
38.
also Alford, supra note 23, at 1367 (calling Handi a "sub silentio" application of
CharmingBetsy).
39.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006).
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
40.
41.

Id.

See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634 ("The commission that the President has
42.
convened to try Hamdan does not meet those requirements [of Common Article 3].").
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a Canon of Domestic
43.
Statutory Construction,43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1134 (1990).
Id.
44.
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law], or if an inconsistency between the norm and the statute can be
resolved, the court should adopt the interpretation that preserves the
maximum scope for both."45 Finally, if courts face an "unavoidable
and irreducible [conflict, they] should refer to the supremacy axioms
such as the latter-in-time rule and doctrines of justiciability to resolve
the conflict."46 Though the last step postulates an unusually strong
view of the doctrine, Steinhardt's formulation nevertheless provides a
useful structural analysis of CharmingBetsy.
B. Charming Betsy After the Military Commissions Act
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan, Congress
attempted to strip jurisdiction over detainee habeas petitions from
U.S. courts by passing the MCA. 47 Section 7 of the MCA purports to
suspend the jurisdiction of courts to consider habeas corpus
applications "filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United
States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination."4 8 The Court found this provision unconstitutional as
applied to Guantdnamo Bay detainees. 49
Other MCA provisions also limit the rights of detainees in U.S.
courts. MCA § 5 provides that "[n]o person may invoke the Geneva
Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus
[proceedings] ... in any court of the United States or its States or

territories."5 0 Similarly, MCA § 6 expressly grants the President
authority "to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions" and to "promulgate higher standards and
administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which
are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions."51
These provisions could cast doubt on the ability of courts to
consider the Geneva Conventions. Due to the constitutional issues
this might raise, however, it seems far more likely that the MCA
seeks only to foreclose the rights of litigants to rely on the Geneva
Conventions as a causes of action.5 2 This would not affect the ability

45.

46.
47.
(2006).
48.

Id.

Id.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600
Id.

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787-97 (2008).
49.
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 5. Though the MCA was amended in
50.
2009, this provision was not significantly altered.
Id. § 6(a)(3).
51.
See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Saying What the Law Is, 1 HARV. L. POL'Y REV.
52.
(ONLINE) (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/11/saying-what thelaw_

is.html (arguing that although the MCA means there may be no private cause of action
under the Geneva Convention, courts may still consider the Geneva Convention).
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of courts to look at the Geneva Conventions under the Charming
Betsy doctrine.5 3
1.

Constitutional Issues Raised by Precluding the Courts from
Looking to the Geneva Conventions

Congress has the authority to pass domestic legislation that
expressly violates international law.54 Yet, the MCA does not purport
to violate the Geneva Conventions or deny their applicability.
Rather, it references them several times, implying that they govern
the President's actions.5 5
Interpreting the MCA to preclude the courts from considering
the Geneva Conventions is therefore constitutionally dubious for at
least two reasons. First, the Constitution grants the Judicial Branch,
not the Executive Branch, the power to interpret the law. 56 As the
Supreme Court recently confirmed in Hamdan, the Judiciary's power
to interpret the law in a manner contrary to executive interpretation
extends to international law, insofar as international law informs
domestic legislation.57 Reading the MCA to assert that the Geneva
Conventions govern the Executive, while also granting the Executive
unreviewable power to interpret the Geneva Conventions, thus runs
counter to the long-established principle of judicial review established
by Marbury v. Madison.58
Second, permitting Congress simultaneously to assert that the
Geneva Conventions govern and to deny any judicial oversight of this
As
assertion destroys Congress's own political accountability."
points
out,
"Congress
international law scholar Deborah Pearlstein
cannot simply ask the courts to ignore certain laws just because it is
too afraid to bear the political consequences of taking them off the
books."6 0 Instead, principles of accountability and transparency
require that Congress write laws as it intends them to be enforced by
the courts. 6 1 These concerns strongly suggest that courts should
avoid interpreting the MCA as precluding them from considering the
Geneva Conventions.

53.
For a detailed analysis relevant to Al-Bihani, see infra Part IV.
54.
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
55.
See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6 (discussing presidential
interpretation of treaty provisions).

56.

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.

57.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006) (disagreeing with the
Government's assertion that Common Article 3 did not apply to the complainant).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168 (1803).
58.
59.
Pearlstein, supra note 52.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
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Issues Raised by the Military Commissions Act § 5
Neither text nor legislative history supports interpreting MCA

§ 5 as preventing courts from considering the Geneva Conventions.
The section forbids an individual from "invok[ing]" the Geneva
It does not mention judicial interpretation. 63
Conventions. 62
Furthermore, the Act's sponsor, Senator John McCain, stated that
Congress intended § 5(a) to "eliminate any private right of action
against our personnel based on a violation of the Geneva
Conventions." 64 Congress also passed the MCA in the wake of
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the Supreme Court came close to
addressing whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing, 65
raising a strong inference that Congress wished to assert its view on
the matter. 66
In Hamdan, a divided Supreme Court held that the military
commissions established by the President in 2001 to try enemy
combatants were illegal.6 7 The President created the commissions
through military order, relying on the AUMF, his power as
commander in chief, and §§ 821 and 826 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ).68 The Court found, however, that the
commissions had not been authorized by the AUMF and that they in
fact violated embedded congressional restrictions on the use of
military commissions under the UCMJ.6 9
First, the Court found that the military commissions were not
authorized under UCMJ Article 31 because their rules deviated from
the rules used for courts-martial.7 0 Next, the Court determined that
UCMJ Article 21 required any commission convened under its
authority to comply with international humanitarian law. 1 The
62.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat.
2600 (2006).
Id.
63.
152 CONG. REC. S10414 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. John
64.
McCain) ("The intent of this provision is to protect officers, employees, members of the
Armed Forces, and other agents of the United States from suits for money damages or
any other lawsuits that could harm the financial well-being of our personnel who were
engaged in lawful-I emphasize 'lawful'-activities.").
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 627-28 (2006) (noting that Johnson v.
65.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950), left the government procedural discretion in hearing
detainee detention challenges).
See 152 CONG. REC. S10414 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen.
66.
John McCain); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-664, at 3 (2006) (asserting that the MCA
would "clarify that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable in United
States courts').
67.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634.
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
68.
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2001).
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
69.
Id. at 620.
70.
Id. at 600 n.31.
71.
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Court found that international humanitarian law necessarily
included the Geneva Conventions and that the procedures utilized by
the military commissions were deficient by those standards. 72
Therefore, the Court held that the UCMJ did not authorize the
government to try Hamdan by military commission.73
By relying on the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court
overruled the lower court's assertion that "the 1949 Geneva
Convention does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its
provisions in court." 74 However, the Court expressly based its
determination on the statutory provision of UCMJ Article 21 and
declined to determine whether the Geneva Conventions in and of
themselves conferred any enforceable rights.75 The self-executing
nature of the Geneva Conventions therefore remained an open
question. 76 MCA § 5(a) most likely constitutes an attempt to ensure
that the Conventions are not treated as self-executing by the courts.77
Leaving aside questions over whether the MCA would actually
have the power to turn a potentially self-executing treaty into a nonself-executing one,78 the provision does not affect the ability of the
courts to consider the Geneva Conventions under Charming Betsy.79
The Charming Betsy doctrine treats international law as an
interpretive tool, not as source of enforceable rights.80 Whether an
individual can invoke the Conventions in courts is irrelevant to the
doctrine's application.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never suggested that the
doctrine distinguishes between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties.8 1 Though the Court has arguably exhibited some reluctance
regarding principles derived from newer, non-self-executing treaties,
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),82 this reluctance does not always extend to international

72.
73.

Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.

74.

Id. at 627.

See id. at 613 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The UCMJ conditions the
75.
President's use of military commissions on compliance not only with the American
common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable,
and with the 'rules and precepts of the law of nations."' (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 28 (1942))).
76.
Id. at 633.
See supratext accompanying note 66.
77.
78.
See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Military Commissions Act, the
Geneva Conventions, and the Courts:A CriticalGuide, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 73, 91 (2007)

(arguing that some provisions of the Geneva Conventions are self-executing).
79.
See Wuerth, supranote 22, at 353.
Id.
80.
81.
Id. at 354.
82.
E.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (discounting the
evidentiary value of non-self-executing treaties like the ICCPR in identifying
actionable norms).
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humanitarian law.8 3
This may be because international
humanitarian law "offers a particularly well-defined body of treaty
and custom-based norms," which "has the dual advantage of
providing a clearer background norm against which Congress can
authorize the use of force as well as providing some limits on the
scope of relevant norms that courts can employ."84 Indeed, the
CharmingBetsy case itself involved the laws of war.85 It thus seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court would develop a sudden aversion to
looking at these laws as an interpretive guide.
3.

Delegated Interpretations

Section 6(a)(3) of the MCA expressly authorizes the President,
pursuant to an executive order published in the Federal Register, to
interpret the Geneva Conventions. 86 A Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report interprets this to mean that "Presidential
interpretations of the Conventions are deemed authoritative (if
published and concerning non-grave breaches) as a matter of U.S. law
to the same degree as other administrative regulations, though
judicial review of such interpretations might be more limited."8 7
Though the President has thus far defined his detention authority in
a court brief, rather than an executive order,8 8 § 6(a)(3) seems to
indicate Congress's desire as to who should interpret the
Conventions.8 9
The CRS report further asserts that § 6(a)(3) precludes "any
judicial challenge to the interpretation and application of the
Conventions except in criminal proceedings."90 As discussed above,
interpreting the MCA to block judicial oversight of the President's
interpretation and application of the Geneva Conventions raises
serious concerns over accountability.91 This is particularly true when

83.
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537-38 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting the deficiencies in
the process received by Guantdnamo detainees).
84.
Wuerth, supra note 22, at 332-33.
85.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
86.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(3)(A), 120
Stat. 2600 (2006).
87.
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33655, INTERROGATION
OF DETAINEES: REQUIREMENTS OF THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT 8 (2009).
88.
Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention
Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantdnamo Bay, In re: GuantAnamo Bay
Detainee Litigation (D.D.C. 2009) (Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)) [hereinafter Respondents'
Memorandum], http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
89.
See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) ("[T]he President has the
authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions.").

90.

GARCIA, supra note 87, at 8 n.38.

91.

See supra Part II.B.1.
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the President acts pursuant to congressional legislation that requires
compliance with the Geneva Conventions.9 2
More fundamentally, although the Judiciary should defer to the
Executive in matters of national security in most instances,9 3 habeas
corpus petitions raise issues of individual liberty that weigh against
absolute deference to executive legal interpretation, even when the
petitions intersect with national security concerns. 94
Courts naturally defer to the Executive on issues of national
security when these decisions "respect the nation, not individual
rights."95 Such questions are "entrusted to the executive, [and] the
decision of the executive is conclusive." 96 Yet, to the extent that
individual liberty is at stake, and the Supreme Court has already
recognized that this is the case at Guantdnamo Bay,9 7 it is the
98
constitutional prerogative of the courts to say what the law is.
These cases fall into what Professors Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal
refer to as the "executive-constraining zone"9 9 precisely because they
As the "[1]aw must regulate the
involve the law, not policy.
executive,"10 0 courts hearing detainee habeas corpus petitions should
evaluate the viability of the Executive's interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions, particularly when Congress purports to require that the
President comply with them.
The Chevron'0 doctrine presents a natural solution. Courts use
Chevron to determine the authority of administrative regulations
1 02
when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the Executive.
Section 6(a)(3) of the MCA is an obvious delegation of lawmaking
power. 03 In combination with constitutional concerns over entirely
stripping interpretive jurisdiction from the courts, this makes
applying Chevron to presidential interpretations of the Geneva
Conventions logical. As Curtis Bradley notes, "Congress stated
expressly in the MCA that it is delegating authority to the executive
'to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions,'

92.
Id.
See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008) ("[Clourts traditionally
93.
have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and
national security affairs.").
94.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
95.
Id.
96.
97.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739.
98.
Id. at 732 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
99.
Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, DisregardingForeign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1239 (2007).
Id. at 1244.
100.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
101.
(1984).
See id. at 865 (providing a process by which courts gauge whether a
102.
particular interpretation is within an agency's statutory authority).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 89.
103.
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and courts give Chevron deference in the analogous situation in
which Congress delegates interpretive authority to administrative
agencies." 10 4
The Chevron doctrine derives from the 1984 case Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, in which an environmental group
challenged an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule
interpreting the Clean Air Act.10 5 The EPA had interpreted the term
"stationary source" in the Clean Air Act to apply to entire plants,
rather than to a single smokestack. 106 Termed a "bubble concept,"
this allowed companies to measure pollution levels based on an entire
plant's emissions rather than individual emissions from each
smokestack. 0 7 The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged
the interpretation, and the lower court held that the bubble concept
was "inappropriate" in light of the Clean Air Act's purpose of
improving air quality.10 8
The Supreme Court disagreed. 0 9 Instead, it held that the court
should have deferred to the EPA's interpretation. 110
It then
established the basic tenets of the Chevron doctrine.' 1
Under
Chevron, when an agency promulgates regulations, courts must apply
a multipart test to determine whether it will defer to the agency's
statutory interpretation.11 2 First, courts must determine "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."1 18 If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.1 14 But, if
Congress's intent is unclear, courts still may not "simply impose
[their] own construction on the statute." 1 5 Instead, "if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."116 Courts must give an agency's
interpretation of a statute "controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary" to terms of that statute.11 7
Applying Chevron to interpretations of detainee habeas corpus
proceedings would require courts to examine international law.
Courts would defer to the Executive's interpretation of these
104.

Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the

Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 343 (2007).
105.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
106.
Id. at 840.

107.

Id.

108.
109.
110.
11.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 842.
at 845.

at 842.
at 843.
at 844.
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principles if no general consensus existed regarding their meaning
and the Executive's interpretation was reasonable.1 18 Thus, the
Executive would not be able to circumvent international law, but
would be accorded judicial deference in areas of the law that remain
unresolved. Assuming that the relevant principle of international
law was well-agreed upon, courts would not need to independently
interpret international law. 119 However, if the law was in dispute,
courts would have to interpret the law on their own in order to
evaluate the Executive's compliance with the AUMF.o20 In the
context of general foreign relations law, some scholars argue that
courts should apply Chevron "to allow the executive branch to resolve
issues of international comity, at least when the underlying statute is
unclear,"'12 and to permit the Executive to interpret ambiguous laws
in ways that "defeat the international relations principles."122 By
contrast, Chevron deference in the instant situation requires the
Executive to follow international law.
Chevron-style deference to executive interpretation of
international law, which encompasses both written treaties and
unwritten principles, may challenge courts. However, international
humanitarian law, which is the body of law at issue in the detainee
hearings, "offers a particularly well-defined body of treaty and
custom-based norms" 123-norms to which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly referred.124 It thus seems unlikely that lower courts
would be unable to adequately apply a Chevron-style test in these
cases.
Moreover, applying Chevron-style deference to debated principles
of international law would in fact ease any putative burdens
Charming Betsy might place on courts, because it permits the
Executive to choose between plausible interpretations. This balances
the need to "generally defer to the executive on the ground that
resolving ambiguities requires judgments of policy and principle, and

See id. ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
118.
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer. . . .").
The logical extension within the second step of Chevron analysis is that
119.
interpretation of international law is incorporated into the Executive's proffered
meaning, which alone receives consideration by the court. Cf. id. (noting that deference
is given to executive interpretations partly for their technical expertise).
See, e.g., id. ("m[f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
120.
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.").
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law,
121.
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1177 (2007).
Id. at 1193.
122.
Wuerth, supra note 22, at 332.
123.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
124.
U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804).
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the fact that the foreign policy expertise of the executive places it in
the best position to make those judgments,"1 25 with the need to check
the Executive's power over individuals. 126
Like Steinhardt's three-part approach to Charming Betsy, 127 a
Chevron-style approach to Charming Betsy should also proceed in
three steps. First, courts should look at binding domestic sources of
law, such as Supreme Court precedent and the language of the
AUMF, to determine issues that remain open to interpretation. For
example, binding precedent interpreting the AUMF authorizes the
President to detain "pursuant to the laws of war"1 28 and confirms that
the conflict between United States and al-Qaeda is a noninternational armed conflict governed by international humanitarian
law. 129 Regardless of disputes over the accuracy of these decisions, 1 30
Court precedent binds the lower courts and the Executive.
Second, lower courts should examine the Geneva Conventions
and other principles of international law. Rather than making their
own pronouncements as to the nature of these laws, courts should
only examine them for their clarity or ambiguity, which could be
determined by the strength of international consensus regarding
their meaning. To the extent the laws are clear, the legality of the
President's actions should also be clear. Third, to the extent that the
laws are ambiguous, courts should analyze them to decide whether
the President's interpretation is reasonably permissible. Courts
should defer to a reasonable interpretation, but overrule an arbitrary
one.

125.
126.

Posner & Sunstein, supra note 121, at 1176.
See Jinks & Katyal, supranote 99, at 1232.

On the one hand, the executive has both unique institutional virtues and
substantial constitutional authority when it comes to foreign affairs. On the
other hand, this sphere of government activity is increasingly governed by
law-law that both purports to regulate the actions of the executive and that is
made at least in part outside the executive. The upshot is that although some
deference is almost certainly often warranted, too much deference risks
precluding effective regulation of executive action.

Id.
127.
See Steinhardt, supra note 43, at 1134.
128.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 548. But see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 884
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
129.
See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629 (noting that while the detainee trials do
not involve members of an armed conflict between signatories to the Geneva
Convention, such a fact holds no analytical significance in this case).

130.

See,

e.g.,

Marko

Milanovic,

The

Obama Administration's Total

Misinterpretationof IHL Regarding the Authority to Detain Suspected Terrorists, EUR.
J. INT'L L. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-obama-administrationstotal-misinterpretation-of-ihl-regarding-the-authority-to-detain-suspected-terrorists/
("[Ilt totally elides the distinction between international and non-international armed
conflicts as a matter of IHL .... [B]ecause AUMF is seen as the statutory authority for
detention, also at work is an elision between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.").
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III. AL-BiHANI V. OBAMA
The President currently claims "authority to detain persons that
the President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and
persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks," as well as
those "who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or alQaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any
person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported
hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces." 1 31 This authority is
expressly pursuant to the AUMF, as construed "in light of law-of-war
principles that 2inform the understanding of what is 'necessary and
3
appropriate."1
Courts disagree on the legality of the President's claimed
authority.' 3 3 A key point of dispute has been whether the President
has authority to detain those who have "substantially supported the
Some courts have
Taliban, al-Qaida, or associated forces."134
accepted this authority as consistent with international law. 35
Others have rejected it.136 But, prior to Al-Bihani, no district court
had questioned the relevance of international law itself to the
decision.' 37
That will probably change after Al-Bihani, with
potentially devastating consequences for detainee habeas petitions
relying on those well-established principles.

131.
Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2.
132.
Brief for Appellees at 16, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (2010) (No. 095051).
133.
See Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney & Rabea Benhalim, The Emerging
Law of Detention: Habeas Cases as Lawmaking 17-21 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 165, 2010) ("Several distinct, or
at least apparently distinct, positions have emerged regarding the scope of the
government's authority, raising the possibility that it currently varies from courtroom
to courtroom.").
134.
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (2009). "Regardless of the
reasonableness of this approach from a policy perspective [it] is simply beyond what
the law of war will support." Id. at 76.
135.
See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding
as a matter of law "the President has the authority to detain persons who were part of,
or substantially supported, the Taliban or al-Qaeda forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States").
136.
See, e.g., Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (finding "the government's
detention authority does not extend to those individuals who have only 'directly
supported hostilities"').
137.
See, e.g., id. at 74 ("Even though this portion of the government's position
cannot be said to reflect customary international law because, candidly, none exists on
the issue."); Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 61 ('Thus, regarding the 'authority' to detain
individuals in an armed conflict, the laws of war are silent with respect to both
international and non-international armed conflicts.").
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A. Background and Facts
Ghaleb Nassar Al-Bihani is a Yemeni citizen who has been held
by the U.S. government at Guantinamo Bay since 2002.138 Prior to
his detention, Al-Bihani was a member of the 55th Arab Brigade, a
paramilitary group allied with the Taliban that fought against the
Northern Alliance,' 3 9 a loosely allied group of Taliban opposition
fighters. 140 Al-Bihani worked as a cook and carried a Brigade-issued
weapon that he never fired in combat.141 Following the October 2001
invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Bihani and the 55th Brigade retreated
and eventually surrendered to the Northern Alliance.142 The Alliance
handed Al-Bihani over to U.S. forces in 2002.143 The United States
subsequently transferred Al-Bihani to Guantdnamo Bay for detention
and interrogation.144
Al-Bihani first petitioned for habeas corpus in 2004.14s However,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his claim until 2006,
when the Supreme Court decided Boumediene.146 Soon after that
ruling, the district court reviewed and denied Al-Bihani's petition,
holding that the government had authority to detain an individual
"who was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners."147 The court found that, based on AlBihani's own admissions, it was "more probable than not" that he was
"part of or supporting" Taliban forces.148 The court thus held that the
government had lawfully detained Al-Bihani.149
Al-Bihani appealed.15 0 On appeal, Al-Bihani advanced several
international law-based arguments. First, he argued that
international humanitarian law did not authorize his initial
detention because he belonged to a volunteer militia, not a state

138.
139.

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id.

140.

Id.; see also Jim Garamone, U.S. Advisors Aid Northern Alliance, Build

Cohesion, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Nov. 6, 2001, available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44481 ("U.S. advisors are helping the Northern Alliance [and
other Taliban opposition groups] become more cohesive ....
141.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869.
Id.
142.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008)), aff'd, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
148.
Id. at 40.
149.
Id.
150.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 868.

1168

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 43:1151

military. 15 1 He argued that, under international law, civilians who
do not directly participate in hostilities cannot be detained.152
Second, Al-Bihani argued that the 55th Arab Brigade lacked any
opportunity to declare its neutrality in the fight against the United
States.s5 3 Therefore, he argued, the United States could not continue
to detain him.154 Third, Al-Bihani argued that, even assuming
international law permitted his initial detention, the United States
must now free him unless it had evidence that he remained
dangerous, because the conflict in which he had participated had
ended. 55
Finally, as the majority opinion characterized the
argument, Al-Bihani presented "a type of 'clean hands' theory,"1 5 6
asserting that any authority the government might have had to
detain him "is undermined by its failure to accord him the prisonerof-war status to which he believes he is entitled by international
law."'
The Government responded that the AUMF authorized the
President to detain al-Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated forces and that
"each of the acts Al-Bihani performed was part of a course of conduct
in which Al-Bihani traveled to Afghanistan to engage in jihad,joined
an enemy brigade, and provided services to the brigade on the front
lines under the command of Al-Qaida and Taliban leaders."' 5 8 It
argued that "Al-Bihani did not simply participate in a war between
the United States and the country of Afghanistan," but in a conflict
between the United States and "the joint forces of al-Qaeida, the
Taliban, and associated forces." 5 9 Furthermore, the Government
asserted its continued power to detain Al-Bihani, as the "conflict in
which Al-Bihani was captured has not ended."160 It noted that
whether hostilities have ended is a political question, and provided a
country report detailing the state of war in Afghanistan.' 6 ' Finally, it
criticized Al-Bihani's "clean hands" theory, pointing out that it was
based solely on the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter in Hamdi.16 2

151.
Id. at 871 ("Al-Bihani interprets international law to mean anyone not
belonging to an official state military is a civilian, and civilians, he says, must commit
a direct hostile act, such as firing a weapon in combat, before they can be lawfully
detained.).
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
Id.
154.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Brief for Appellees, supranote 132, at 17.
159.
Id. at 36-37.
160.
Id. at 32.
161.
Id. at 34.
162.
Id. at 39.
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B. The Court's Legal Reasoning
First, the appeals court panel found that international law could
not limit the President's power to detain Al-Bihani.163 Noting that
Al-Bihani's claims "rely heavily on the premise that the war powers
granted by the AUMF and other statutes are limited by the
international laws of war," the court flatly asserted that "[t]his
premise is mistaken. There is no indication in the AUMF, the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ... or the MCA of 2006 or 2009, that
Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extratextual limiting principles for the President's war powers under the

AUIMF."164
According to the court, because Congress has not domestically
implemented it, international law is "not a source of authority for
U.S. courts."16 5 The court also noted that Congress could authorize
the President to violate international law, and asserted that the
AUMF and subsequent statutes may have done so. 166 Thus, the court
concluded that it had "no occasion here to quibble over the intricate
application of vague treaty provisions and amorphous customary
principles,"1 6 7 and that it would look solely to "the sources courts
always look to": domestic statutes and controlling case law. 168
The court determined that the proper domestic source of the
President's detention authority lay in the AUMF. 16 9 The court
properly interpreted this provision, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdi, as activating the President's war powers. 170
The court also examined several provisions of the MCA for
guidance.i 7 1 It determined that the provisions authorized the
President to establish military tribunals to try aliens accused of
supporting terrorism. 172 The court concluded that, "the government's
detention authority logically covers a category of persons no narrower
than is covered by its military commission authority" 7 3 because "any
person subject to a military commission trial is also subject to
detention."17 4 It therefore found that the MCA and the AUMF
authorized the detention of Al-Bihani because, based on his own

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 869, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 871-72.
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1170

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 43:1151

admissions, "Al-Bihani was both part of and substantially supported
enemy forces." 175
Second, the court dismissed Al-Bihani's claim that the United
States had to release him even if he had been initially detainable. It
again asserted that international law was irrelevant, 176 and, thus,
that the President was authorized by domestic law to detain AlBihani.177 The court also stated that international laws "affording
notice of war and the choice to remain neutral have only applied to
In the court's view, even if international
nation states."17 8
humanitarian law governed Al-Bihani's claim, the government could
detain him. 179 Third, the court rejected Al-Bihani's argument that he
should be released because the United States' conflict with the
Taliban had ended.1 80 The court disagreed with Al-Bihani factually,
citing the troops on the ground in Afghanistan.18 It also found that,
based on Supreme Court precedent, the question of whether a conflict
is "ongoing" is committed to the Executive Branch.' 8 2 Finally, the
court rejected Al-Bihani's clean-hands argument, because the theory
lacked authority under any domestic statute, and its only case law
precedent was Justice Souter's dissent in Hamdi. 8 3
C. Al-Bihani v. Betsy
The majority's legal reasoning in Al-Bihani reverses Charming
Betsy. Rather than assuming that Congress intends ambiguous laws
to comply with the international legal obligations of the United
States,1'84 the court wrongly asserted that Congress must expressly
state its intent to comply with international law.' 8 5 Not finding an
express statement, the court found international humanitarian law
was irrelevant to its ruling.186

Id. at 873-74.
175.
176.
Id. at 873.
177.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 874.
181.
Id.
Id. at 874-75 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168-70 (1948)).
182.
Id. at 875 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (Souter, J.,
183.
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
184.
See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871 (noting that "[elven assuming Congress had
185.
at some earlier point implemented the laws of war as domestic law through
appropriate legislation, Congress had the power to authorize the President in the
AUMF and other later statutes to exceed those bounds" but did not do so in the
AUMF).
186.
Id.

2010/

AL-BIHANI, NOT SO CHARMING

1171

Not only does this analysis ignore Charming Betsy,187 but, as
Judge Stephen Williams points out in his concurrence, 188 it is also
difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's analysis of the AUMF
in Hamdi. The majority cited Hamdi for the proposition that the
"international laws of war are helpful to courts when identifying the
general set of war powers" that the AUMF has authorized. 189 But,
the Supreme Court did not use international humanitarian law
merely to identify the President's war powers. 9 0 Rather, the Court
used international humanitarian law to define the President's war
powers, including its implicit limitations.' 9 1 For example, the Court
relied on international law when it held that the President could
detain individuals during ongoing active hostilities, in order to
prevent combatants from returning to battle. 192 The circuit court
accepted this interpretation in Al-Bihani,193 which appears nowhere
in the domestic legislation that the Supreme Court examined.19 4
Rather, this holding came directly from international law.' 9 5
By repudiating any international constraints, Al-Bihani "goes
well beyond what even the government ... argued."196 The
Government expressly conceded that "[t]he authority conferred by the
AUMF is informed by the laws of war." 19 7 But, Al-Bihani ignores the
Government's assertion that it can detain only those who have
"substantially" supported enemy forces.1 98 Instead, the majority
adopted the Government's previous, more permissive AUMF

187.
See CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 ("[A]n act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains .... ).
188.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., concurring) ("[W]e understand
Congress's grant of authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include
the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding
is based on longstanding law-of-war principles." (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521)).
189.
Id. at 875 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520).
190.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (limiting Congress's grant of authority to
detain prisoners as limited to the duration of the conflict pursuant to longstanding
law-of-war principles").
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874-75 (analyzing whether the conflict in
Afghanistan is still ongoing so as to determine whether the President has the authority
to detain the petitioner pursuant to the AUMF and "longstanding law-of-war
principles").
194.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
195.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 ("It is a clearly established principle of the law
of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.")
196.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., concurring).
197.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 132, at 35.
198.
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 n. 1 (citing Brief for Appellees, supranote 132, at
21-22).
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interpretation, which permits the President to detain anyone who had
merely "supported" enemy forces.19 9
IV. WHAT IS A "REASONABLE" INTERPRETATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DURING

THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS HEARINGS?
Ironically, the D.C. Circuit panel could have upheld Al-Bihani's
detention even if it had followed CharmingBetsy. Al-Bihani admitted
that he had been part of an armed unit allied with the Taliban and
that he had carried a weapon as part of his duties.20 0 Under the
AUMF and international law, a judge might reasonably have found
him detainable as an enemy combatant. 20
The section below illustrates how Al-Bihani might have looked
had it followed Charming Betsy. It applies the Chevron framework
established in Part III. First, it examines established Supreme Court
precedent and the language of the AUMF and notes areas that have
not been foreclosed, either by Congress or, judicial precedent, from
judicial interpretation. Second, it surveys international law and
notes areas of significant disagreement over how that law should
apply to detainee cases. Finally, it turns to the specific facts of AlBihani's case.
A. Binding Domestic Authorities
Two primary domestic authorities govern the President's power
to detain: the AUMF and Supreme Court cases. The AUMF permits
the President to use force against "nations, organizations [and]
persons" who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the
September 11 attacks or who "harbored" such persons, so long as that
force is "necessary and appropriate" and his purpose is to prevent
future attacks. 202
Supreme Court precedent both confirms and limits this
authority. It permits the President to claim AUMF-authorized power

199. Id. at 873-74 (recognizing that both "substantially" and "merely" supported
are valid criteria and independently sufficient to satisfy the standard for detainment);
see, e.g., Memorandum from the Deputy Sec'y of Def. on Order Establishing Combatant
Status Review Tribunal to the Sec'y of the Navy (July 7, 2004),
http://www.defenselink.millnews/Jul2004/d20O407O7review.pdf.
200. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869.
See, e.g., id. at 884 (Williams, J., concurring) (stating that regardless of the
201.
analysis used to determine the defendant's role within al-Qaeda or the Taliban,
defendant's support was sufficient to find his detention lawful).
202. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
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to detain.20 3 It also confirms that at least some aspects of the conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda represent a noninternational armed conflict. 204 This sets the stage for subsequent
decisions addressing the contours of the President's detention
authority.
B. General Principlesof InternationalHumanitarianLaw
International law governs who states may detain during an
international armed conflict.
Generally, states can detain
combatants and "[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military
aircraft crews, war correspondents, [and] supply contractors . . . ."20s
States may only detain other civilians if they are a security threat. 206
By contrast, international humanitarian law is silent as to who
states can detain during a non-international armed conflict. 207 Thus,
some scholars assert that domestic law and international human
rights law, which prohibit "prolonged and arbitrary detention,"20 8
govern the conflict. Others, including the government, argue that
international humanitarian law displaces domestic and international
human rights law during non-international armed conflict. 209
According to this view, international humanitarian law merely
acknowledges that parties to a non-international armed conflict will
inevitably detain their enemies, while also imposing minimum
humane conditions on those detentions. 210
The Government asserts that international humanitarian law
displaces domestic and international human rights law during noninternational armed conflicts and, thus, that it governs detentions at

203.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
204.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
205.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
This provision may be viewed as a constraint rather than an authorization-in other
words, that the Conventions do not permit states to detain combatants, but, rather,
require states to detain combatants instead of summarily executing them or convicting
them in a criminal trial.
206.
Id. art. 5.
207.
Laura M. Olson & Marco Sass6li, The Relationship Between International

Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and
Internment of Fighters in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
599, 621 (2008).
208.
Id. The basis of this union is partly founded upon the landmark human
rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
209.
See, e.g., Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 88, at 1 (arguing that
"[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed
conflicts ... must inform the interpretation of the detention authority Congress has
authorized).
210.
Olson & Sass6li, supranote 207, at 627.
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Guantinamo Bay. Furthermore, because international humanitarian
law contains few standards for how the government should treat
Guantinamo detainees, the government has decided to apply
standards found in the law governing international armed conflict by
analogy.2 1 ' Some scholars have criticized this approach, 212 but it is
currently accepted by at least some traditional authorities, notably
the International Committee of the Red Cross. 213
The Government's approach looks at an individual's membership
in a particular group, analogizing members to combatants and nonmembers to civilians. 214 Thus, the United States deems civilians
with a strong nexus to an armed group detainable by analogy to the
law governing international armed conflict. 215 However, because
such civilians are not affiliated with a state, they are not entitled to
the privileges traditionally granted to prisoners of war, such as
immunity from criminal prosecution for their participation in the
conflict. 216
Until Al-Bihani, courts accepted the Government's analogy
approach but split over how to define membership in a particular
group and whether support of that group justified detention. 217 Some
courts held that the government could detain civilians "accompanying
the armed forces without actually being members thereof."218 Others
This ambiguity remains a significant source of
disagreed. 219
disagreement among the lower courts. The Government itself
declined "to attempt to identify, in the abstract, the precise nature
and degree of 'substantial support,' 220 beyond noting that it would

211.
Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 88, at 5-6; see Olson & Sass61i,
supra note 207, at 623-24.
See Milanovic, supra note 130. Because international humanitarian law is
212.
built on the principal of reciprocity between states, one argument against analogizing
in this way is it would give non-state actors the right to detain members of state
armies. Id.
213.
Intl Comm. for the Red Cross [ICRC], Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participationin Hostilities Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw (May 2009) (Nils
http/www.icr.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmlall/direct-participation-report-res/
Melzer),
$Fileldirect-participation-guidance-2009-icrc.pdf.
214.
Respondents' Memorandum, supranote 88, at 7.
215.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supranote 133, at 16.
See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding
218.
that "an al-Qaeda member tasked with housing, feeding, or transporting al-Qaeda
fighters could be detained as part of the enemy armed forces notwithstanding his lack
of involvement in the actual fighting itself').
See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2009)
219.
(rejecting the holding of the Gherebi court that "substantial support" could be used as
an independent basis for detention).
Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2.
220.
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not "justify the detention at Guantinamo Bay of those who provide
unwitting or insignificant support . . . .
C. The Detention of Al-Bihani
The Chevron-style deference delineated in Part III easily can be
illustrated using Al-Bihani's case. First, as noted above, Supreme
Court precedent confirms that the government's authority is governed
Court precedent also supports the
by international law.22 2
Government's assertion that it is engaged in a non-international
armed conflict in Afghanistan, where Al-Bihani was captured. 223
Second, the Government's analogy approach to its detention authority
is contested, 224 but, in light of acceptance by the ICRC, 225 seems
reasonable under Chevron deference.
A court ruling on the merits of Al-Bihani's detention need not
reach the Government's claimed authority to detain individuals who
substantially support enemy forces.
The circuit court and the district court explicitly found that, by
his own admissions, Al-Bihani carried a weapon while working under
a Taliban-affiliated militia. 226 Other evidence existed that Al-Bihani
had intentionally joined the militia with the purpose of supporting
the Taliban. 227 Thus, a court deferring to the President's analogy
approach could, accepting these facts, find Al-Bihani detainable as
"analogous to a member of a State's armed forces, who may serve as a
cook but is also trained for combat." 228 Finally, though this ruling
229
would require Al-Bihani's release when ongoing hostilities ceased,
2 30
the Government presented facts that the hostilities had not ended.
If the court accepted this factual argument, it could find Al-Bihani's
continued detention legal.23 1

Id.
221.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004).
222.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
223.
See, e.g., Milanovic, supra note 130 (arguing that authority under the
224.
AUMF is not necessarily informed by principles of the laws of war).
See ICRC, supra note 213 (applying international humanitarian law to
225.
determine the rights of civilians taking part in armed international conflicts).
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
226.
See Brief for Appellees, supra note 132, at 15 (noting that Al-Bihani was
227.
subject to the command structure of the 55th Brigade, which included key Taliban and
al-Qaeda officers; he retreated with the 55th brigade when the U.S. began bombing,
and surrendered with the 55th brigade to the Northern Alliance).
Laura Marie Olson, Guantdnamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District
228.
Court's Decisions Consistent with IHL Internment Standards?,42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 197 (2009).
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 205, art. 4 (requiring release and
229.
repatriation at the "cessation of active hostilities").
Brief for Appellees, supra note 132, at 32.
230.
See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 205, art. 4.
231.
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This simple analysis, while not exhaustive, demonstrates that
the D.C. Circuit panel's ultimate holding was not necessarily wrong
under international law. Under the Charming Betsy doctrine,
however, the court should have reached that conclusion by construing
the AUMF in light of international laws, not by asserting that the
President is completely unconstrained by them. 232 Because the
detainee habeas corpus litigation concerns fundamental individual
rights, the court has a duty to oversee the Executive's actions at
Guantinamo. For the reasons discussed above, it cannot perform
that duty without examining international law.

V. CONCLUSION

In September 2009, President Obama declined to seek additional
legislative authority for detentions at GuantAnamo Bay. 233 Thus, for
the time being, 2 34 it is beyond question that the lower courts must
develop rules and procedures to govern the habeas corpus cases that
the Supreme Court has charged them with overseeing. 235 Though
these courts may believe that this process would be better left to the
political branches, 236 the political branches have, through silence,
delegated the job to them.
The courts are up to the task. Because international law has
always played a role in U.S. jurisprudence, judges already have the
necessary tools to grapple with the international legal issues that the
detainee cases present.23 7 The Judiciary's traditional role of
protecting individual liberty from executive overreach 238 necessitates

232. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
233.
Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 133, at 1.
234. See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002 (2010) (cert. denied)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Answering just the first of these questions would provide
much-needed guidance on two important issues with which the political branches and
federal courts have struggled since we decided Boumediene."); Jack Goldsmith, LongTerm Terrorist Detention and Our National Security Court 8 (Brookings Inst.,
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. & Hoover Inst. Working Paper Series on Counterterrorism and
American Statutory Law, 2009), http://www.brookings.edul%7E/medialFiles/rc/papers/2009/
0209_detention-goldsmithl0209_detention-goldsmith.pdf ("Congress must ... get involved
to provide the court with rules and institutional structure to create better organization and
greater legitimacy and effectiveness for the long haul.").
235.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (extending the
Suspension Clause to foreign detainees at Guantinamo Bay, but failing to provide
standards to govern detainee habeas corpus petitions).
236. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J.,
concurring) (arguing that because of Congress's policy expertise, democratic legitimacy,
and oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, it is particularly situated to determine
habeas standards).
237.
See CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
238.
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 725 (noting that the Suspension Clause is
necessary to protect against "cyclical abuses" of power).
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that court utilize these tools to examine the Executive's
interpretation of its authority over the Guantinamo Bay detainees
and strike the appropriate balance between individual liberty and
national security.
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